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THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: THE RIGHT
OF MEMBER STATE WITHDRAWAL
I. INTRODUCTION
The Treaty of Rome,' establishing the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC), does not provide for the withdrawal of a member
state from the Community.2 Article 240 expressly states that the
Treaty is-"concluded for an unlimited period,"3 which implies that
the Treaty creates a permanent organization.' In addition, the EEC
Treaty places permanent limitations on the sovereign rights of the
member states.5 Given the perpetual tenor of the language of arti-
cle 240, a difficult question arises concerning the ability and right
The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of Thomas P. Scott, III in translating
several German articles and documents.
' Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty]. The EEC Treaty was signed in Rome on March 25,
1957, by six member nations: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Lux-
embourg, and the Netherlands.
The EEC Treaty went into effect on January 1, 1958, with the goal of establishing "an
ever closer union among the European peoples .... " EEC Treaty, preamble, at 14. The
Treaty was an attempt to foster European integration, economically, politically, and socially.
On January 1, 1973, three more nations, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom,
acceded to the EEC. Treaty between the Member States of the European Economic Com-
munity and the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, and the Kingdom of Norway and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, January 22, 1972, 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 73) 5 (1972). The most recent enlargement of the EEC was the addition of Greece on
January 1, 1981. Treaty of the Accession of Greece, March 28, 1979, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 291) 9 (1979).
These ten nations also are united by two other treaties: the Treaty instituting the Euro-
pean Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter cited as ECSC
Treaty]; and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, March 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167 [hereinafter cited as Euratom Treaty]. In 1967, the legislative bodies
of these three Communities (EEC, ECSC, and Euratom) merged to form the European Com-
munity (EC). Treaty of the Member States of April 8, 1965, entry into force July 1, 1967,
10 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 152) 2 (1967).
Throughout this Note, any references to the Treaty of Rome, the Treaty, or the EEC
Treaty refer to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, unless specified
otherwise.
1 1 L. CONSTANTINESCO, DAS RECHT DER EUROPAISCHEN GEMEINSCHAFTEN 179 (1979);
Soldatos, Durde et Dnonciation des Traitds de Rome, 47 REVUE DE DROIT INT'L 257, 260-61
(1969).
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 240, at 92.
Soldatos, supra note 2, at 257. See also D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 24 (1973), who discuss the irreversible
design of the EEC.
' Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, 593-94, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425, 455-56.
The court held that the EEC Treaty created a new legal system wherein each member
state transferred part of its sovereign powers to the Community. As the Community has
an unlimited duration, this transfer binds the member states by permanently limiting their
sovereign rights. Id.
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of a member state to defy the implications of article 240 and ter-
minate its obligations under the Treaty.
To date, no member state has withdrawn from the EEC, but
several have threatened to withdraw. For example, in February
and October, 1974, the United Kingdom Labour Party issued Elec-
tion Manifestos that mandated renegotiation of the terms of
Britain's accession treaty with the EEC and a national referen-
dum to determine Britain's continued membership.' The EEC heads
of state met in Dublin in March, 1975, to conclude the negotia-
tions, after which the British cabinet voted by a majority of 16-7
that the United Kingdom should remain in the EEC.' By national
referendum of June 5, 1975, a 67.2% British majority voted for
the United Kingdom to remain in the EEC.'
Another incident of threatened withdrawal occurred during the
1981 national election campaign in Greece. PASOK, the Panhellenic
Socialist Movement, included in its platform a promise to call a
national referendum to determine the continued full membership
of Greece in the EEC.' Although PASOK won, the referendum is
not likely to occur as long as Constantine Caramanlis remains presi-
dent of Greece. ° A national referendum can be called only by the
president, and Caramanlis is in favor of EEC membership."
Finally, the possibility of British withdrawal from the EEC may
be an issue again due to Britain's high level of contributions to
the EEC budget," the rising value of North Sea oil," and the decline
Irving, The United Kingdom Referendum, June 1975, 1 EUR. L. REv. 3, 4 (1976). Great
Britain had a conversative Tory government when Britain's accession treaty was concluded
with the EEC. This treaty is cited in full, supra note 1.
Irving, supra note 6, at 4.
8 Id. at 3. Although a Labour government called the referendum and advocated withdrawal,
the Labour Party was divided on the issue. Harold Wilson, a leader of the Labour Party,
applied for British entry into the EEC in 1967 when he was prime minister. In the 1970
elections, he opposed the movement within the Labour Party that advocated holding a
referendum on British membership in the EEC. After the Labour Party lost the 1970 elec-
tions, Anthony Wedgewood-Benn led a stronger movement within the Labour Party to
call a referendum on EEC membership. Wilson feared this challenge to his party leader-
ship, and when the Conservative government completed its negotiations with the EEC
for British membership, Wilson became an anti-Marketeer himself. In 1974, a Labour govern-
ment was elected and Wilson again became prime minister. On January 23, 1975. Wilson
announced that a referendum would be held on renegotiated terms. Id. at 3-4, 8-9.
Greece and Europe, Would the Socialists pull out?, ECONOMIST, Aug. 15, 1981, at 36, 37.
Muller, Yes to the Prospect of Allagi, TIME, Nov. 2, 1981, at 38.
" Id.
, Pluenneke, A Case for Britain's leaving the EC, Bus. WK., Mar. 10, 1980, at 43. The
estimated 1980 net contribution of Britain to the EC budget was $2.7 billion, which was
60% of the total EC budget.
"3 Id. In 1975, when Britain began selling North Sea oil, the price was $12.30 per bbl.
By 1980, the price had risen to $33.75 per bbl, for estimated total oil revenues of $3.1
billion in 1980.
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of British industry." In 1981, the Labour Party promised that upon
election of a Labour government, Britain would withdraw from
the EEC without even holding a national referendum."
In light of these recurring threats,"6 this Note will examine the
right of a nation to withdraw from the EEC by analyzing the Treaty
itself, interpretations of the Treaty by the European Court of
Justice, the practice of member states vis-A-vis the EEC Treaty,
and general rules of international law.
II. THE EEC TREATY
International agreements often provide for renewal at the will
of the parties or for termination upon a certain date or upon the
occurrence of certain events." For example, the treaty establishing
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was "concluded
for a period of fifty years from its entry into force."'8
The EEC Treaty, on the other hand, contains neither an express
provision for termination nor an express right of withdrawal by
", Id. For example, the British share of auto sales in Great Britain was 40% in 1973
when Britain joined the EEC. By 1980, this percentage had fallen to 17%.
" European Community: We'll Love You and Leave You, ECONOMIST, July 25, 1981, at
53. The Labour Party already has a plan by which to withdraw Britain from the EEC.
This plan, devised by the national executive of the Labour Party, consists of a six step
process:
1. Unofficial contacts, before the next British election, to alert other EEC
governments.
2. Preliminary negotiations "within weeks of taking office" to establish a time-
table for withdrawal.
3. An amending bill in the British parliament to remove the authority of EEC
institutions within the United Kingdom.
.4. Negotiations with the EEC to achieve a smooth withdrawal.
5. A transition period to follow an orderly disengagement.
6. The repeal of the 1972 European Communities Act by the British parliament.
Id. at 54. No British national referendum is mentioned in the process. The reason is that
the Labour Party feels a Labour election victory would signify a mandate for withdrawal. Id.
15 On February 23, 1982, another incident dealing with EEC withdrawal occurred when
Greenland voted to withdraw from the European Community. Greenland is not an EEC
member state, but as a former colony of Denmark, Greenland had an affiliated status with
the EEC. In a 1979 referendum, Greenland won local autonomy, and then in 1982, a 52%
majority voted for Greenland to leave the EEC. The EEC response was to accede to
Greenland's wishes. Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 1982, at 30, col. 3.
Greenland's reasons for leaving were a desire for lower food prices than those available
through the Common Market, and a desire to exercise more direct control over local fish
resources. However, Greenland must give up $25 million per year in loans and subsidies
that it had been receiving from the EEC. Id.
i 6 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY S 240.03 (1981).
" ECSC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 97, at 227. Compare with EEC Treaty, supra note
1, art. 240, at 92, in which the drafters did not limit the duration of the Treaty. This sup-
ports a finding of intent to create a perpetual agreement. See Soldatos, supra note 2, at 257.
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member states. As the travaux preparatoires of the EEC Treaty
were not published, the reasons for the absence of a provision
relating to withdrawal are uncertain.'9 Three possible explanations
have been suggested. First, negligence of the drafters may explain
the lack of a withdrawal provision.' Second, the absence may reflect
an intent by the drafters to preclude a right of withdrawal.2 Finally,
the possibility remains that the drafters hoped to dissuade member
states from withdrawing.22
The first explanation is unlikely because the original member
states rejected the French proposal that a right of withdrawal be
included in the Treaty.23 The second explanation similarly must
be discredited because the Federal Republic of Germany specifically
reserved the right to reconsider its participation in the EEC if
reunification with the German Democratic Republic should occur.
Therefore, the third explanation may reflect most accurately the
intent of the drafters, especially since article 240 manifests a desire
for a Community of unlimited duration. 5
Several authorities adhere to the view that the treaties
establishing the European Communities have placed Europe in an
irreversible process of European integration. 6 This is consistent
with the goal expressed in the Treaty's preamble to strive for "an
ever closer union among the European peoples .... "27 If the Treaty
were intended to be of unlimited duration and to create an irrever-
sible process of European integration, the right of a member state
to withdraw from the EEC would be incompatible with such ex-
press goals. 8




1 J. LANG, THE COMMON MARKET AND COMMON LAW 65 n. 106 (1966).
24 1 L. CONSTANTINESCO, supra note 2, at 182-83. The German reservation was placed in
the minutes of the Treaty negotiations on February 28, 1957. The translated text reads
as follows:
The government of the Federal Republic of Germany maintains the understand-
ing that in the case of the reunification of Germany a re-examination of the treaties
on the Common Market and Euratom will take place.
Id. at 183.
25 Soldatos, supra note 2, at 261-62.
2 See, e.g., id. at 259; D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 4, at 24.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, preamble, at 14. The European Court also has inferred
that as the preamble of the Treaty refers not only to governments but to peoples, the Treaty
is attempting to institute a process of integration for the EEC member states. See N.V.
Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse ad-
ministratie der Belastingen, 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 12, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 105, 129.
28 See 6 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 17, at S 240.03.
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III. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
Three concepts express the position of the European Court of
Justice:
A. Accession to the EEC is a permanent limitation of member state
sovereignty. Upon accession to the Treaty of Rome, each EEC
member state transferred certain rights and obligations from its
domestic legal system to the EEC in order to form the Commun-
ity legal system.' When the member states transferred their
sovereign rights in specified "limited fields" to the EEC, 0 these
rights were limited permanently."
B. The supremacy doctrine of EEC law makes the EEC Treaty
resemble a constitution. The Treaty of Rome is different from a
traditional treaty in that it resembles a constitution for the EEC.2
The basis of this theory is the concept of the supremacy of Com-
munity law over national law.' As the EEC Treaty has no express
' "The transfer by the States from their domestic legal system to the Community legal
system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent
limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible
with the concept of the Community cannot prevail." Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 585, 594, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425, 456. Presumably, unilateral withdrawal would
be "incompatible with the concept" of the EEC and would not prevail against EEC law.
' N.V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse
administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 12, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 105,
129. Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, 593, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425, 455.
The sovereign rights transferred from the member states to the EEC are only those "aris-
ing under the Treaty." Supra note 29. The European Court also has stated that once these
sovereign powers are transferred to the EEC, they cannot be withdrawn or restored to
the member state "except by virtue of an express provision of the Treaty." Commission
v. France, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1003, 1018, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 453, 475. In other
words, as long as an express provision restoring transferred rights does not exist in the
Treaty, EEC membership and the member states' transfer of powers are permanent ac-
tions. It must be noted, however, that this case was an interpretation of the Euratom Treaty.
As the EEC Treaty was founded in the same spirit and at the same time as the Euratom
Treaty, it is probable that the European Court would interpret the EEC Treaty similarly.
31 Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, 594, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425, 456.
The interpretation by the European Court that the EEC Treaty permanently limits sovereign
rights is consistent with the character of permanence of the EEC expressed in article 240.
32 Bebr, Directly Applicable Provisions of Community Law: The Development of a Com-
munity Concept, 19 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 257, 261 (1970). Accord D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra
note 4, at 68-69. The European Court describes the Treaty as "more than an agreement
which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states." N. V. Algemene
Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse administratie der
Belastingen, 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 12, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 105, 129.
' Amministrazione delle Finanze v. Simmenthal, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 629, 644,
23 Common Mkt. L.R. 263, 284. This assertion has been compared with the suggestion
of Oliver Wendell Holmes that the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution (U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl. 2) is the cornerstone of United States constitutionalism. Casper, The Emerging Con-
stitution of the European Community, 24 U. CHI. L. SCH. REC. 5, 6 (1978).
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supremacy clause,4 however, this concept is one of judicial
creation. 5 The apparent authority of the European Court to order
national courts to consider EEC law supreme is to be found in
article 189.36 The legal system created by the EEC Treaty is one
that is "an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States
and which their courts are bound to apply."37 EEC law cannot be
overridden by existing or subsequently enacted laws of the member
states, as such a possibility would undermine the character of Com-
munity law." In short, "where the Community is competent to act,
its law is also supreme." 9
C. The EEC Treaty creates a new legal order. EEC law is neither
internatinal law nor constitutional law.' Rather, the Treaty of Rome
creates a third, new and independent "legal order" that occupies
a realm between the two.4 1 Unlike the typical international treaty,
execution of the EEC Treaty has been removed from the hands
of the parties and placed within the authority of the EEC
institutions.4 1 On the other hand, the Treaty is not a true constitu-
tion, because the "Community is not a 'state,' that is: neither a
super-state nor a quasi-state nor.., a federal state."43 Therefore,
"[i]n contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC Treaty
has created its own legal system .. .
The crux of these concepts is that the European Court inter-
prets the Treaty as permanently binding on the member states.5
Casper, supra note 33, at 6; Malawer, International Law, European Community Law
and the Rule of Reason, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 17, 32 (1974).
' See Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, 594, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425, 456.
" Id., 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 456.
"' Id. at 593, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 455.
' Id. at 594, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 456.
' Casper, supra note 33, at 11.
40 Dagtoglou, European Communities and Constitutional Law, 32 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 256, 257
(1973).
41 Id. See Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, 593, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425,
455. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr und Vorratsstelle far Getreide und
Futtermittel, 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1125, 1134, 11 Common Mkt. L.R. 255, 283.
12 D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 4, at 68. The governing bodies of the European Com-
munities are the European Council, Commission, Parliament, and the European Court of
Justice. See generally id. at 99-157 for an explanation of the functions and powers of these
EEC institutions. Note that this source refers to the European Parliament by its earlier
name, the European Assembly.
:3 Dagtoglou, supra note 40, at 259.
' Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, 593, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425, 455.
Expressing this idea more clearly, Advocate-General Lagrange of the EEC stated that "the
system of the Common Market is based upon the creation of a legal system separate from
that of the Member States but nevertheless intimately and even organically tied to it ... 
Id. at 605, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 443.
41 Id. at 594, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 456.
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If a member state passed legislation to withdraw from the EEC,
EEC law would prevail over conflicting national legislation."
IV. THE PRACTICE OF MEMBER STATES
VIS-A-VIS THE EEC TREATY
The argument opposing the supremacy doctrine of the European
Court focuses upon the status that each member state gives treaties
vis-a-vis national legislation. A member state imight attempt
withdrawal by passing subsequent national legislation repealing
the effects of the EEC Treaty for that nation. Although the EEC
Treaty does not contain an express right of withdrawal, the power
that each member state accords subsequent national legislation
to override the binding effects of a prior treaty may determine
a right to withdraw.
In six of the member states, the Treaty prevails over subse-
quent inconsistent national legislation. The constitution of the
Netherlands expressly permits treaties and decisions made by in-
ternational organizations to prevail over domestic laws and the
constitution." In Luxembourg, case law apparently holds that
treaties prevail over both prior and subsequent national legislation."
Belgian courts have held that where subsequent legislation is in-
consistent with the EEC Treaty, Treaty law must prevail." The
Greek constitution provides that international conventions "shall
prevail over any contrary provision of law."' ' Most authorities on
the Greek constitution interpret this language to include both prior
and subsequent statutes.,' The French Constitution of 1946, under
which France ratified the EEC Treaty, provided that once ratified,
a treaty prevails over prior and subsequent national laws.2 The
1958 constitution also gives treaties "duly ratified or approved"
a status superior to national legislation, provided that the other
" See id., 3 Common Mkt. L.R. at 456.
47 GRONDWET [GRw. NED.] art. 66 (Neth. 1953, amended 1963), relevant provisions reprinted
in R. PLENDER & J. USHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
219 (1980). See also J. LANG, supra note 23, at 54-55.
4 J. LANG, supra note 23, at 55; E. STEIN, P. HAY, & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNI-
TY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 95 (1976). Both sources make the same assertion
but cite no Luxembourg cases as support.
" Judgment of May 21, 1971, Cour de Cassation (Premikre Chambre), Belg., 11 Common
Mkt. L.R. 330, 373.
'0 CONST. OF GREECE art. 28, S 1, relevant provisions reprinted in A. Fatouros, International
Law in the New Greek Constitution, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 492, 494 (1976).
"' Fatouros, supra note 50, at 503.
M CONST. OF 1946, art. 26, 28 (Fr.). J. LANG, supra note 23, at 53, briefly discusses these
provisions.
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parties implement the treaty."3 The French Cour de Cassation has
held that article 55 of the French constitution makes the EEC
Treaty prevail over subsequent inconsistent French statutes, and
that the reciprocal implementation clause does not apply to the
EEC Treaty.' This change in the constitution, therefore, has not
altered the previous French position with regard to the EEC.
Finally, Ireland has an express constitutional provision permit-
ting membership in the EEC." The constitution further provides
EEC law the force of law in Ireland, and permits the State to enact
laws and take measures necessary to fulfill the obligations of EEC
membership. 6 Similarly, the constitution provides for the invalida-
tion of any legislation passed by parliament that is repugnant to
the constitution.57 Interpreted together, these two provisions in-
dicate that subsequent legislation repealing the EEC Treaty in
Ireland would be repugnant to the constitution and would not
prevail against the Treaty.
In three other member states, the status of treaties vis-A-vis
subsequent inconsistent national legislation has been unclear. In
West Germany, the German Constitution permits the transfer of
sovereign powers to international organizations.' The Federal Ger-
man Constitutional Court has decided that a treaty, such as the
EEC Treaty, concluded under article 24 of the constitution, prevails
against subsequent legislation unless EEC law conflicts with a fun-
damental right guaranteed by the constitution. 9 However, a more
recent decision has gone even further by implying that EEC law
now prevails over German fundamental rights.' Conversely, in Den-
mark, EEC law is not assured absolutely of prevailing against na-
tional law. Under the Danish constitution, an international organiza-
tion cannot be granted power to act contrary to the constitution. 1
Nevertheless, a leading Danish scholar argues this constitutional
' CONST. art. 55 (Fr.), relevant provisions reprinted in R. PLENDER & J. USHER, supra note
47, at 196.
Judgment of May 24, 1975, Cass. ch. reun., Fr., 16 Common Mkt. L.R. 336, 369.
IR. CONST. art. 29, S 4(3), relevant provisions reprinted in R. PLENDER & J. USHER,
supra note 47, at 180.
6 Id.
" IR. CONST. art. 154. E. STEIN, P. HAY, & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 48, at 97.
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 24, S 1 (W. Ger.), relevant provisions, reprinted in R. PLENDER
& J.. USHER, supra note 47, at 186.
Judgment of May 29, 1974, BVerfG, 2d Senate, W. Ger., 14 Common Mkt. L.R. 540, 551.
See C. Tomuschat, BVerfG Contra EuGH-FriedensschluB in Sicht, 33 NEuE JURISTISCHE
WOCHENSCHRIFT 2611 (1980).
" CONST. S 20 (Den.), relevant provisions reprinted in R. PLENDER & J. USHER, supra note
47, at 183. See also E. STEIN, P. HAY, & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 48, at 97.
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provision means that once parliament has delegated powers within
a certain field to an international organization, parliament has
precluded itself from legislating further within that field." The
Italian Constitutional Court has avoided interpretation of the prior-
ity between EEC law and inconsistent national legislation, but has
implied that EEC law will prevail except in the area of fundamental
constitutional rights. 3
In the remaining member state, the Treaty does not appear
to prevail against subsequent inconsistent national legislation. A
constitutional doctrine exists in the United Kingdom that parlia-
ment has absolute sovereignty and cannot curtail, impair, or limit
the powers of future parliaments. 4 This doctrine prevents parlia-
ment from passing any laws that cannot be repealed. 5 Therefore,
it appears that the European Communities Act' passed by parlia-
ment in 1972 cannot bind a successive parliament and could be
repealed. Consistent with this argument, parliamentary debates
about British accession to the EEC declared adoption of the EEC
Treaty would not surrender the ultimate sovereignty of parliament,
nor limit any of parliament's power to repeal the Act applying the
Treaty. This viewpoint, however, does not give parliament a
license to repeal the Treaty-enacting legislation at will. 8 Unless
62 E. STEIN, P. HAY, & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 48, at 97.
Judgment of Dec. 27, 1973, Corte Cost., Italy, 14 Common Mkt. L.R. 372, 386, 389.
Feld, Legal Dimensions of British Entry into the European Community, 37 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 247, 252 (1972). Arguments have been advanced that challenge the doctrine of
parliament's absolute sovereignty. For instance, in 1707, parliament enacted the Act of
Union with Scotland, whereby legal restraints were placed upon parliament and a new legal
order was established. Id. at 252-53. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 4, at 227. If this act
can transfer legislative sovereignty and establish a new legal order uniting the parliaments
of England and Scotland, the U.K. parliament should have the same authority to transfer
a portion of its legislative authority to the EEC to establish a new legal order of the EEC.
See Feld, supra, at 253.
F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 332 (1926).
European Communities Act, 1972, ch. 68, at 1947.
67 243 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 421 (1962). See also 323 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 367 (1971).
But cf. Blackburn v. Attorney-General, [1971] 2 All E.R. 1380, where the plaintiff sought
declaratory judgment on the effect of British entry into the EEC. The claim was that member-
ship would amount to permanent surrender of British sovereignty, thereby binding later
parliaments, which violates British constitutional doctrine. Id. at 1381. The court assumed
that accession to the Treaty would place Britain on an irreversible course limiting its
sovereignty. Id. at 1382. However, the court also noted that power concerning the treaties
rests with the Crown and not with the courts. Id. Therefore, presumably parliament, rather
than the judiciary, has the last word on the restraints placed on British sovereignty by
the EEC Treaty.
" 243 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 421-22 (1962). The 1967 White Paper also recognized that
parliament should refrain from passing subsequent legislation that is inconsistent with EEC
law. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 4, at 226-27.
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parliament has compelling justification for its actions and the ap-
proval of the other member states, repeal of the Treaty would con-
stitute a serious breach of international law and of the obligations
assumed upon accession to the EEC. 9
V. RULES OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW
The European Court interpretation that the EEC Treaty created
a new legal order gives rise to several arguments concerning the
law that should be applied to determine whether a right of
withdrawal exists. If the Treaty rises to the level of a constitution
as has been suggested," it can be argued that whenever a nation
freely joins an international organization and accepts its author-
ity, that nation knows the constitution of the organization, is aware
of the obligations imposed by it, and for that reason should not
be released from honoring the rule of paccta sunt servanda.1 If, on
the other hand, the Treaty is regarded as an international treaty,
the law of treaties would apply, thereby providing a right of
withdrawal.72
However, the EEC Treaty is not an ordinary treaty.73 Rather,
the Treaty created a "new legal order of international law,"74 and
this principle may exclude the applicability of the usual rules of
international law dealing with treaty termination and withdrawal.75
The Treaty specifies that the methods provided in the Treaty for
settling problems are exclusive,76 which would seem to disallow
69 243 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 421-22 (1962). In contrast, the combined provisions of SS
2-3 of the European Communities Act imply that the courts are obligated to apply the
decisions of the European Court of Justice in cases concerning EEC law, including its
supremacy doctrine. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 4, at 228-29. It also has been argued
that if parliament repealed the Act, the British courts would be obligated to enforce the
legislation, even if it meant a violation of international law. Feld, supra note 64, at 253.
" Bebr, supra note 32, at 261.
" Feinberg, Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization, 39 BRIT., Y.B. INT'L
L. 189, 216 (1963). The rule of pacta sunt servanda is that "[e]very treaty in force is binding
upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 at 289, reprinted
in 8 1. L. M. 679, 690 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention].
72 The Vienna Convention codifies most of the existing principles of international treaty
law that grant a right of withdrawal. I. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
TREATIES 6 (1973). The pertinent provisions of the Vienna Convention that deal with treaty
termination, denunciation, and withdrawal are articles 54-64. Vienna Convention, supra note
71, at 699-703.
71 See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
" N. V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse
administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, 12, 2 Common Mkt. L.R. 105, 129.
71 1 L. CONSTANTINESCO, supra note 2, at 182.
"' EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 219, at 87.
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recognition of any general principles of international law. Never-
theless, several international jurists contend that principles of in-
ternational law codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties are applicable to the EEC Treaty as they are to any other
international treaty, and provide the EEC member states a right
of withdrawal under the stipulated circumstances, even though the
EEC Treaty itself does not provide such a right."
The EEC will recognize rules of general international law if they
conform to the spirit of the Treaty and the interpretations of the
European Court of Justice.7" Judges on the European Court often
have interpreted and applied rules of general international law.79
On the other hand, the European Court does not apply general
international law principles automatically and without distinction.'
For example, in Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium,"l the Euro-
pean Court rejected an argument by the advocate-general on a
point of general international law. 2 Nonetheless, if a matter of
Treaty withdrawal were to come to trial, the European Court could
take jurisdiction under the powers granted by the Treaty.'
Assuming that general rules of international law can be applied
to EEC Treaty interpretation, perhaps some conclusions about a
right of withdrawal can be drawn from the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties and other treaties that create international
organizations and institutions but do not provide an express right
of withdrawal.
A. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
In 1969, most of the existing rules of customary international
law dealing with treaties were codified in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties." The Vienna Convention is "an agreement
among nations on the law governing the formation and operation
of treaties, how they should be interpreted, amended and ter-
" 1 L. CONSTANTINESCO, supra note 2, at 180.
,8 Soldatos, supra note 2, at 269.
7 Id. at 261, 266.
' Id. at 266.
" 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 625, 4 Common Mkt. L.R. 58.
n Id.
' See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 169, 170, 173, 175, 177, 219, at 75-77, 87. Contra
Malawer, supra note 34, at 35, who argues that because the treaty has no withdrawal pro-
vision, an issue concerning withdrawal may not be a matter of Treaty interpretation and
therefore not within the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. In such a case, the
International Court of Justice might hear the case. Id.
" Vienna Convention, supra note 71, preamble, at 680.
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minated and the rules governing their invalidity."'' As of December
31, 1979, only four EEC member states had ratified the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties."6 Additionally, the Vienna Con-
vention "applies only to treaties which are concluded by States
after the entry into force of the present Convention with regard
to such States.8 s The Vienna Convention entered into force on
January 27, 1980, which was years after the conclusion of the EEC
Treaty." Still, the principles codified in the Vienna Convention
represent rules of customary international law that were in effect
when the EEC Treaty was concluded.
Article 56 of the Vienna Convention specifically addresses
withdrawal from a treaty, such as the EEC Treaty, in which there
is no express withdrawal provision.89 Article 56 recognizes an im-
plied right of treaty denunciation or withdrawal even if one is not
expressed in the treaty, provided that the intent of the parties,
inferred from all relevant factors, indicates that the right should
exist.90 More specificially, article 56 provides that without a provi-
sion regarding withdrawal, a treaty can be denounced only if (1)
the parties intended to permit the possibility of withdrawal, or
(2) the nature of the treaty implies a right of withdrawal.91 In either
situation, the denouncing party must give twelve months notice
of its intent to withdraw.92
It is arguable that neither of these circumstances are applicable
to the EEC Treaty. First, intent can be determined by the
Deutsch, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 297 (1971).
See UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN RESPECT OF WHICH THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL PERFORMS DEPOSITARY FUNCTIONS 597, 598 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MULTILATERAL
TREATIES DEPOSITARY]. Three EEC nations have both signed and ratified the Vienna Conven-
tion: Denmark signed on April 18, 1970 and ratified on June 1, 1976; Italy signed on April
22, 1970 and ratified on July 25, 1974; the United Kingdom signed on April 20, 1970 and
ratified on June 25, 1971. The fourth, Greece, ratified on October 30, 1974 but has not signed
the Convention. Two other nations have signed without ratification: Germany (Federal
Republic) on April 30, 1970, and Luxembourg on September 4, 1969. Id.
67 Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 4, at 682.
MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITARY, supra note 86, at 597. The EEC Treaty was con-
cluded on March 25, 1957. See supra note 1.
' Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 56, at 699. Other relevant provisions, which
are discussed infra in text accompanying notes 132-34, 140, 154, and 162, include articles 54,
59, 60, 61, and 62.
' Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances (Rebus Sic Stantibus), 61 AM. J. INT'L
L. 895, 919 (1967). Lissitzyn discusses article 53 of the early drafts of the Vienna Conven-
tion, but article 53 corresponds to article 56 of the final draft.
" Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 56(1), at 699.
Id. art. 56(2), at 699.
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statements included in the travaux pnrparatoires and by the subse-
quent conduct of the parties."3 The travaux prdparatoires of the
EEC Treaty have not been published; but arguably, the intent of
the EEC Treaty drafters was to exclude an express right of member
state withdrawal in order to discourage the use of that option.'
Also, if membership in the EEC is permanent as expressed by the
European Court of Justice,"5 this further implies no intent for a
right of withdrawal. Second, unless the parties indicate contrary
intentions, a treaty of alliance is the type of international agree-
ment that implies a right of withdrawal after reasonable notice
is given. The EEC Treaty is not a treaty of this type. Also, a
treaty establishing an international organization does not inherently
imply a right of withdrawal. 7 Therefore, it can be concluded that
article 56 offers no right of withdrawal from the EEC.
B. Treaties Creating International Organizations
The EEC is neither a federal state98 nor a confederation." Rather,
the EEC Treaty creates a new order of international law.' The
EEC is a separate supranational entity consisting of sovereign
states governed by the Treaty and guided by the law of interna-
tional institutions.' As international law can be used to solve EEC
Feinberg, supra note 71, at 219.
94 Soldatos, supra note 2, at 261-62. See also text accompanying notes 19-25.
"5 Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, 593-94, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425, 455-56.
" UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 71 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as U.N. TREATIES CONFERENCE]. This source contains commentaries of the
draft articles of the Vienna Convention and those found in the official records of the United
Nations. Article 53 of the early draft commentaries corresponds to article 56 of the final
draft. For a survey of the legislative history of each provision of the Vienna Convention,
consult S. ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES: A GUIDE TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
VIENNA CONVENTION (1970).
' Feinberg, supra note 71, at 217.
98 Dagtoglou, supra note 40, at 259, who argues that a state has a determinable ter-
ritory, identifiable citizens, and "an unlimited field of activity"; whereas none of these
characteristics apply to the EEC.
D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 4, at 22, who explain that the member states of a con-
federation retain complete sovereignty. This is not characteristic of EEC member states
because they must transfer certain sovereign powers to the EEC permanently. Costa v.
ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, 594, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425, 456.
10 See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
101 See D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 4, at 23. This assertion does not attempt to equate
the EEC with an ordinary international organization. The purpose of the EEC is to foster
European integration. In contrast, ordinary international organizations promote interna-
tional cooperation rather than integration.
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problems when both EEC law and national law fail, international
legal principles governing international organizations can provide
analogies for determining the possibility of withdrawal from the
EEC.
There are two prevalent views regarding withdrawal from inter-
national organizations. The first adopts the rationale that as treaties
create international organizations, the law of treaties governs
withdrawal.10 Therefore, membership termination is permissible
even if such a right is not granted by the organization's charter.0 3
The second view asserts that the right to withdraw from an inter-
national organization exists only if it has been recognized, but that
such recognition need not be expressed in the charter.104
Most treaties establishing an international organization contain
an express provision either permitting or forbidding withdrawal."5
Other treaties establishing international organizations are concluded
expressly for an unlimited duration but still permit a right of
withdrawal.""6 This illustrates that a right of withdrawal could be
compatible with a treaty of indefinite duration, such as the EEC
Treaty.
The League of Nations provided its member states an express
right of withdrawal; but its successor, the United Nations (UN),
has no such provision in its Charter.107 A right of withdrawal was
excluded purposely from the United Nations Charter to decrease
the possibility that the right might be exercised.08 However, the
UN was forced to draft an interpretative declaration on the mat-
ter of withdrawal, stating that withdrawal was permissible under
"exceptional circumstances" and that the UN would not "compel
that Member to continue its cooperation in the Organization."109
This right was exercised in 1965 when Indonesia announced its
intent to withdraw from the UN." Although Indonesia specifically
'" E. STEIN, P. HAY, & M. WAELBROECK, supra note 48, at 19.
103 Id.
10, Feinberg, supra note 71, at 215.
000 Id. at 189. An example of such a treaty is the Articles of Agreement of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, opened for signature December 27, 1945, art. XV, 60 Stat. 1401, 1421-22,
T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39, 94-96 [hereinafter cited as IMF Articles].
1"6 Feinberg, supra note 71, at 189 n. 6. Examples of such treaties are the Security Treaty
between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, done September 1, 1951, art. X,
3 U.S.T. 3420, 3424, T.I.A.S. No. 2493; Charter of the Organization of American States,
April 30, 1948, art. 112, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 2436, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 90-92.
100 Feinberg, supra note 71, at 190.
100 Id. at 199.
100 Id. at 200 (quoting DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION, SAN FRANCISCO, 1945, Doc. 1086, 1/2/77, at 267 (1945)).
... Schwelb, Withdrawal from the United Nations: The Indonesian Intermezzo, 61 AM. J.
INT'L L. 661, 665-66 (1967).
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requested withdrawal, the UN Secretary-General did not recognize
Indonesia's withdrawal. His response was worded as a recognition
of cessation in cooperation with the UN, expressing the hope that
in due time Indonesia would resume full cooperation."' If the UN
had recognized the withdrawal, Indonesia's membership would have
terminated and re-entry into the UN would have been possible
only by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommen-
dation of the Security Council."2 Instead, because the UN recognized
Indonesia's actions only as a cessation of cooperation, Indonesia was
allowed to resume its UN participation without any objections from
the General Assembly when on September 16, 1966, Indonesia ex-
pressed the desire to "resume full co-operation with the United
Nations."' 3
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has an express provi-
sion that extends to members a right to withdraw or by which
members can be compelled to withdraw; however, notice must be
given to exercise the right to withdraw."4 A right of withdrawal was
provided because the treaty placed considerable limits upon the
previously held freedoms of the member states with respect to
monetary matters." The IMF was new, untried, and experimental. "'
It foreseeably could have developed into an undesirable experi-
ment for some nations." 7 Therefore, a right of withdrawal was in-
cluded in order that a nation no longer desiring membership could
withdraw at any time without the delay of troublesome procedures,
and in order that other nations would be encouraged to risk the
"experiment" and join, knowing their actions could be reversed."8
A member state, therefore, may withdraw from the IMF at any
time and without stating a reason."9 Only three nations, Poland,
Czechoslovakia and Cuba, have exercised this option to withdraw."
The IMF also can compel a member state to withdraw if that nation
... Id. at 666.
I U.N. CHARTER art. 4. para. 2.
Il Schwelb, supra note 110, at 668-69.
"' IMF Articles, supra note 105, art. XV. The IMF is an intergovernmental organization
of over one hundred states that regulates a code of good behavior in the sphere of interna-
tional payments, lends resources to national monetary authorities to meet balance of
payments deficits, and promotes international cooperation by providing counsel and technical
assistance to its members. J. FLEMING, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND: ITS FORM AND
FUNCTIONS 3 (International Monetary Fund Pamphlet Series No. 2, 1964).
"I' J. GOLD, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (International





"m Id. at 6.
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fails to fulfill its obligations under the agreement. 2' Whenever
member states have failed to fulfill treaty obligations, however,
the IMF has been reluctant to apply these sanctions in the hope
that the nation in question would resume full observance of the
treaty as soon as possible.'22
As a final example, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) also contains an express provision for withdrawal.2 ' Any
contracting party may withdraw from the agreement six months
after written notice of withdrawal is sent to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations."M In addition, a member state "may separate-
ly withdraw on behalf of any of the separate customs territories
for which it has international responsibility and which at the time
possesses full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial
relations ....125 If a member state should fail to fulfill its obliga
tions under the agreement, other member states have a right of
self-help and may retaliate by withdrawing substantially equivalent
tariff concessions."' As well, a member state has no obligation to
apply the agreement when dealing with particular acceding con-
tracting parties.
VI. ANAYLSIS: INTERRELATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE NATURE OF THE EEC
The EEC Treaty has no express provision for termination, nor
any express right of withdrawal by the member states. No direc-
tives or resolutions from the EEC legislative bodies exist concern-
ing a right of withdrawal by a member state.'28 Case law has dealt
with the issue indirectly, noting that once a nation has joined the
Community and transferred part of its sovereign powers to the
Community, these powers can neither be withdrawn nor restored
to the member state without the authority of an express provi-
sion in the Treaty." On the basis of these sources of EEC law,
... IMF Articles, supra note 105, art. XV, S 2(b).
' J. GOLD, supra note 115, at 6-7.
12 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194. GATT is an international agreement that stipulates the rights
and duties among the participating nations with respect to trade and tariff concessions.
12 Id., art. 31, 61 Stat. at A74-75, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. at 282.
125 Id.
128 K. DAM, THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS 86 (1970).
12 Id. at 22; Protocol Modifying Certain Provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, signed Mar. 24, 1948, art. 35, 62 Stat. 1992, 1994, T.I.A.S. No. 1763, 62 U.N.T.S.
30, 34.
" This assertion is made after an exhaustive review of indexes of EEC law.
1 Commission v. France, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep, 1003, 1018, 11 Common Mkt. L.R.
453, 475. See supra note 30.
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it appears that a member state may not withdraw from its Treaty
obligations. 130
Yet, the Treaty was not intended to be inalterable; it can be
modified or annulled by agreement of all parties to the Treaty."'
If applicable to the EEC Treaty, the Vienna Convention also per-
mits withdrawal from a treaty or termination of treaty obligations
by agreement of all contracting parties.'32 Commentaries of the
Vienna Convention drafts stress that when a treaty has no provi-
sion for withdrawal or termination, unanimous consent of the par-
ties must be obtained, because termination or withdrawal affects
the rights of all parties.33 The Vienna Convention also grants a
right of termination if the parties conclude a subsequent treaty
incompatible with or intended to replace the first.'
A. Arguments in Support of a Right of Withdrawal
Although the EEC Treaty provides no express right of with-
drawal, and the European Court likely would interpret the Treaty
to prohibit such action, several arguments can be advanced in sup-
port of a right of withdrawal when the Treaty is viewed in the
context of general international law.
The first, and least supportable, of these arguments is for denun-
ciation ad nudum,11 5 treaty denunciation made without any special
reason. EEC law discredits this argument because arbitrary denun-
ciation is incompatible with the general nature of the EEC'36 and,
more specifically, the implications of article 240.11
The second argument asserts a right of denunciation when there
has been a serious violation of the Treaty by a single member
state. 8 Most authorities insist that denunciation consequent to a
130 See 6 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 17, S 240.03.
... Soldatos, supra note 2, at 258. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 235, 236, at 91, provide
for modifications of the Treaty. Article 236 grants a power to amend the Treaty, and arti-
cle 235 gives the EC Council authority to assume powers not expressed within the Treaty
in order to effectuate the objectives of the EEC Treaty. Both articles require a unanimous
vote. Id.
Consistent with the drafters' intent to foster irreversible integration, the Treaty can
be terminated only if replaced by a new form of European integration. 6 H. SMIT & P.
HERZOG, supra note 17, S 240.04.
132 Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 54, at 699.
133 U.N. TREATIES CONFERENCE, supra note 96, at 69. The commentary of article 51 of the
early drafts corresponds to article 54 of the final draft.
13 Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 59, at 700-01.
135 Soldatos, supra note 2, at 259 n. 14.
3 Id. at 264.
137 6 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 17, S 240.05.
13 Soldatos, supra note 2, at 259 n. 14.
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treaty violation can occur only if the violation concerns an essen-
tial provision of the treaty.139 The Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties codifies this principle by permitting treaty termination,
withdrawal, or suspension for a material breach of the treaty.""
The EEC Treaty, however, stipulates that any disputes within
the EEC arising from alleged Treaty violations should be settled
through the dispute settlement methods established by the
Treaty. 4 The drafters of the EEC Treaty anticipated the possibility
of Treaty infringements by member states and provided safeguards
to remedy conflicts arising therefrom. First, the Treaty can be
amended by unanimous action.'42 Second, Treaty obligations may
not preclude certain actions taken by a member state for the pro-
tection of its essential security interests.'43 Third, articles 169 and
170 grant the complaining party, whether it be the European
Commission"' or a member state,"5 the power to sue the infring-
ing nation before the European Court of Justice. 4 ' That court has
the authority to order the member state guilty of infringement
or secession to comply with its treaty obligations. 7 Many pro-
ceedings involving Treaty infringements have been brought before
the European Court of Justice, but none have ended in with-
drawal."8 However, if a member state chooses to refute the court's
authority, the European Court has no power of sanction."9 The
power of the court under article 171 is purely theoretical because
the EEC institutions do not have the judicial power to enforce
the court's decrees and compel the re-integration of the withdraw-
ing state into the EEC.5" As a practical matter, if a member state
were to ignore the European Court and continue to violate the
Treaty for an extended period of time, the action probably would
be treated as exclusion of the member state from the EEC.I Other-
wise, EEC Treaty violations should be resolved through the Treaty
dispute settlement methods." 2
ls Id. at 265 & n. 56.
.. Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 60, at 701.
.' EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 219, at 87.
" Id., art. 236, at 91.
", Id., arts. 223, 224, at 88. See also 6 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 17, S 240.05[b].
.. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 169, at 75.
"5 Id., art. 170, at 75.
' Id., arts. 169, 170, at 75.
", Id., art. 171, at 75.
148 1 L. CONSTANTINESCO, supra note 2, at 181.
141 Soldatos, supra note 2, at 266.
'" Id. at 264.
151 6 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 17, S 240.06. Presumably, exclusion is not the same
as withdrawal.
11 See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 219, at 87.
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The third argument asserts a right of withdrawal as a conse-
quence of serious national problems."5 The Vienna Convention
allows withdrawal or termination when supervening events make
execution of the treaty impossible, provided that the impossibility
is not the result of a breach of treaty provisions.'" In contrast,
the EEC Treaty drafters attempted to anticipate possible national
problems and provide safeguards in the Treaty to remove obstacles
to Treaty performance.1 First, if the national difficulties are the
result of Treaty violation by another member state, recourse under
the Treaty is provided through articles 169 and 170, instead of
the safeguard provisions of the Treaty. " Second, a list of specific
Treaty provisions sets forth measures that can be taken in deroga-
tion of the Treaty when certain specified national problems con-
flict with Treaty compliance.'57 Third, articles 223 and 224 also per-
mit temporary derogation from the Treaty to resolve serious mat-
ters of national security, internal disturbances, war, and interna-
tional obligations."5 Finally, the Treaty always can be modified. 59
Only if these safeguard/relief provisions fail can it be argued that
a serious national problem provides a right of withdrawal. 160
The fourth argument supporting a right of withdrawal is the
principle of rebus sic stantibus, which provides for treaty withdrawal
or termination in the event a substantial change in circumstances
occurs after the treaty comes into force, and the orginally existing
circumstances were an essential basis upon which the agreement
was made."' The Vienna Convention contains a provision similar
in substance.' This provision in the Vienna Convention was in-
tended to apply especially to "perpetual" treaties, which have no
provision for termination."
Despite recognition of this principle under rules of general in-
ternational law, this argument might have difficulty passing legal
muster in the EEC. First, the nation claiming rebus sic stantibus
' 6 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 17, S 240.05.
15 Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 61, at 702.
.. See 1 L. CONSTANTINESCO, supra note 2, at 181.
' Id. at 306.
's Id. at 305. See also 6 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 17, S 226.03; Costa v. ENEL,
1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, 594, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425, 456.
'" See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 223, 224, at 88.
'" See id., arts. 235, 236, at 91.
160 6 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 17, S 240.05. The drafters' efforts to provide relief
for serious national problems indicate an attempt to discourage withdrawal from the EEC
as an option for solving these problems.
16 Id. S 240.05. See Soldatos, supra note 2, at 267.
1 See Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 62, at 702.
" U.N. TREATIES CONFERENCE, supra note 96, at 78. Article 59 of the draft commentaries
corresponds to article 62 of the final draft.
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should attempt to resolve the problem using the safeguards pro-
vided within the EEC Treaty.' Second, if the change in circum-
stances is caused by a breach of Treaty obligations, the injured
member state cannot argue a legal right of withdrawal through
rebus sic stantibus." Rather, claims involving breaches of the Treaty
are settled by using the mechanisms of articles 169, 170, and 171.6'
Third, rebus sic stantibus might not apply to EEC law at all."67 The
dynamic character of the Treaty permits adjustment to change
in circumstances by modification of the Treaty through the Coun-
cil and EEC institutions.168 Then too, the EEC is required to settle
all disputes using the procedures provided by the Treaty. 9 There-
fore, general rules of international law, such as rebus sic stantibus,
do not necessarily present valid legal arguments in the EEC unless
relations with non-EEC parties are at issue.17
On the other hand, an anticipated change in circumstances was
the justification for the German reservation of a right to withdraw
from the EEC should the two German nations ever reunite.171 It
has been suggested that this indicates an acceptance of the rebus
sic stantibus principle in the EEC."7 It seems more likely that
because West Germany reserved this right expressly, it was in-
tended to be the exception and not the rule. 73
B. Arguments in Support of Nonrecognition of a Right of
Withdrawal
The above arguments supporting a right of withdrawal are
weakened greatly by an examination of the nature of the EEC as
created by the Treaty. Withdrawal can occur legally only with the
consent of all member states; and, until withdrawal is accepted
by the other member states, the withdrawing member continues
to be bound by its treaty obligations.174 The Treaty promotes a
process of transforming the European member states into a "more
"' See 1 L. CONSTANTINESCO, supra note 2, at 181. See also supra notes 14147 and accom-
panying text.
" 6 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 17, S 240.05.
16 See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 169, 170, 171, at 75.
167 6 H. SMIT & P. HEcRZOG, supra note 17, § 240.05.
16I Id.
"' EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 219, at 87.
170 6 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 17, S 240.05.
171 Soldatos, supra note 2, at 268-69. See supra note 24.
' Soldatos, supra note 2, at 268.
' 1 L. CONSTANTINESCO, supra note 2, at 182-83.
114 J. LANG, supra note 23, at 65.
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homogenous body politic.""' As long as a member state retains
its sovereignty it can withdraw from the EEC and disobey the
Treaty, whether its actions are legal or illegal."6 On the other hand,
if the member state has become so enveloped in the process of
integration that its economic structure and national interests are
intertwined with those of the EEC, withdrawal may be impracti-
cal.' Reliance upon the political and economic benefits accruing
from decades of integration could yield detrimental consequences
if a nation broke its EEC affiliation sharply and thereby suffered
a sudden reduction in benefits. 78 However, by not withdrawing,
a nation can maintain the status quo within the Community and
thereby stagnate the integration process. "9
Finally, two instances might permit acceptance by all member
states of withdrawal from the EEC, even though the idea of
withdrawal conflicts with the goal of European integration. Both
are political considerations. The first would occur if the two German
nations were reunited and Germany were to exercise its right to
reconsider its participation in the EEC. 180 The second example of
permissible withdrawal would occur if a purely communist govern-
ment were to come to power in a member state.8' The Soviet Union
and most communist parties openly reject the EEC, '82 and their
ideologies conflict with those of the EEC. Therefore, if a member
state were to turn to a form of communist government, it prob-
ably would be preferable to permit that nation to withdraw from
the EEC rather than to allow the goals of that government to
frustrate and undermine the economic goals of the EEC.'
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The EEC Treaty is an agreement that promotes European in-
tegration between the member states. ' The Treaty does not pro-
vide a right of withdrawal, stating that the "Treaty is concluded
for an unlimited period." 88 The EEC legislative bodies have been
"I D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 4, at 24.
176 Id.
177 Id.
171 1 L. CONSTANTINESCO, supra note 2, at 182.
17 D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 4, at 24.
" See 1 L. CONSTANTINESCO, supra note 2, at 182-83. See supra note 24.
" 1 L. CONSTANTINESCO, supra note 2, at 182.
1 Id.
183 Id.
'" The EEC is to create "an ever closer union among the European peoples ... EEC
Treaty, supra note 1, preamble, at 14.
'" Id., art. 240, at 92.
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silent on the issue.1" The European Court of Justice has determined
that EEC membership entails a permanent transfer of sovereign
powers to the EEC,187 which would imply no right of withdrawal.
International legal principles indicate that when a treaty estab-
lishing an international organization fails to provide for a right
of withdrawal, the intent of the parties determines the existence
of such a right.' The intent of the Treaty drafters was to ac-
complish an irreversible process of European integration and to
prevent obstacles to this process by incorporating safeguards into
the Treaty to solve dilemmas among the parties that might other-
wise give rise to withdrawal or termination as a possible solution.1"
Based upon this intent, it appears that no legal right of unilateral
withdrawal exists.
The EEC could follow a course similar to that of the U.N., if
confronted with member state withdrawal, and treat the withdraw-
ing state as temporarily ceasing participation in the Treaty. In
certain situations, the Treaty handles problems that arise in just
that manner by providing safeguard provisions that permit tem-
porary noncompliance with the Treaty until the problem is solved."g
A caveat to this right is that an extended period of noncompliance
probably would lead to exclusion from the Treaty.191
Some member states consider a right of withdrawal inherent
in the idea that sovereignty cannot be impaired;1 92 whereas, the
European Court of Justice considers accession to the EEC to en-
tail a permanent transfer of certain sovereign powers from the
member states to the EEC."' As a practical matter, if a member
state were determined to withdraw, the EEC has no sanctions that
can be applied to compel lawful compliance with the Treaty.1" Thus,
from this point of view, it really is of no consequence whether a
legal right of withdrawal exists. However, as another practical mat-
ter, a member state's determination to withdraw may be more
easily said than done. Years of integration in which a member
state's domestic economy and political structure have become inter-
M See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
18 Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, 593-94, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425, 455-56.
18 Vienna Convention, supra note 71, art. 56(1)(a), at 699. See also Feinberg, supra note
71, at 215.
1 L. CONSTANTINESCO, supra note 2, at 182.
18 See supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
'g' 6 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 17, S 240.06.
192 See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
88 Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 585, 593-94, 3 Common Mkt. L.R. 425, 455-56.
18 Soldatos, supra note 2, at 266.
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twined with that of the EEC cannot be undone at will without
the risk of severe repercussions."' It would appear that a member
state's withdrawal from the EEC and reversal of the process of
integration would necessitate the cooperation of the other member
states.
As a final practical matter, consent to withdraw might be re-
quired if the two German nations ever were reunited or if a purely
communist regime were elected in a member state.1 In such situa-
tions, a permissible right of member state withdrawal is conceiv-
able.
Creation of the EEC for an unlimited duration197 and the intent
of the member states to promote European integration"' express
the nature of the EEC. A right of withdrawal is incompatible with
this nature, other than the exceptions noted above, and therefore
a right of member state withdrawal does not exist in the EEC.
If a country were to withdraw from the EEC, "havoc could be caused
but the Community would not come to an end and the insitutions
would not cease to function."1 The perpetuation of the EEC as
implied by article 240 rests upon the guarantee of good faith in
treaty performance and "the political will of the member states
that the Community system shall succeed.200
John A. Hill
", See D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 4, at 24.
'" 1 L. CONSTANTINESCO, sutpra note 2, at 182-83. See supra note 24.
" EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 240, at 92.
See id., preamble, at 14.
'" D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, supra note 4, at 69.
Id. at 229.
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